What do banks do? Two things. First, they maintain their customers' deposits, paying interest on them for the privilege. Second, they lend some of their customers' funds to creditworthy borrowers, charging them interest for the privilege. Banks make money, in brief, by taking a bit off of the top when transferring interest payments from their debtors to their depositors.
What is the economic value of what banks do? Banks perform the important tasks of liquidity & maturity transformation. In so doing, they play the role of financial intermediaries--institutions that match savers with borrowers, facilitating investment. Investment, in turn, is a critical driver of economic growth.
A depositor, in general, wants to invest in a short-term, highly liquid vehicle. That is, she wants to be able to, on a moment's notice (short maturity), convert her investment into cash (high liquidity). A bank deposit offers her just that. As long as her savings reside in the bank they yield her interest. Whenever she wishes, however, she may make a withdrawal, converting her investment into cash without warning.
A borrower, in general, wants to provide a long-term, illiquid vehicle. That is, he wants to be able to spend his borrowed funds over a long period of time (long maturity), without necessarily being able to convert his purchases into cash in the interim (illiquidity). For example, if he borrows from the bank to buy a house, he may not be able to fully pay off his mortgage until it matures (say, thirty years from now), because his stream of income prevents this. A bank loan offer him exactly what he wants. As long as he makes his payments on time, he need not fully pay for his purchases until his loan matures, which may be well into the future.
How do banks manage to match depositors with borrowers, then, given their divergent wants? They manage to do this thanks to the law of large numbers. The withdrawal behavior of each depositor is very unpredictable. Because the behavior of one depositor is independent of the behavior of others, however, the law of large numbers entails that the withdrawal behavior of many depositors is very predictable. A bank that enjoys a large number of customers may confidently predict aggregate withdrawals on a given day, even if it cannot predict how much each customer withdraws. As a consequence, banks keep just enough cash in their vaults (their reserves) to honor these predictable withdrawals, freeing up the remaining funds to be invested with long-term, illiquid borrowers. Banks, therefore, make possible productive investments that would otherwise not be possible, thereby contributing to economic growth.
Sounds too good to be true, doesn't it? There is, indeed a catch: Exploiting the law of large numbers is only possible because, most of the time, the behavior of one depositor is independent of the behavior of others. If withdrawals become correlated, the business model of banking breaks down. Suppose, for illustration, that a bank invests heavily in one sector of the economy (e.g., housing), believing that this promises the highest risk-adjusted returns for its depositors. Suppose further that many of these investments go belly up, with large numbers of borrowers defaulting on their loans. A depositor, observing this, worries about the ability of her bank to make good on her future withdrawals. Moreover, she knows that if she is worried about this, other depositors must be similarly worried. Even if the bank is in fact solvent, it is never in a position to make good on every deposit simultaneously, for some of the funds have been invested. Knowing that others will make larger-than-usual withdrawals, fearing that the bank is insolvent, it is in her best interest to beat them to it. If she isn't one of the first to get her money out of the bank, the bank may not be able to honor her deposits, even if it was solvent in the first place.
A banking panic (or bank run) is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fears concerning a bank's solvency trigger correlated withdrawals, rendering the bank insolvent regardless of its prior condition. Systemic banking panics occur for similar reasons. If many banks turn out to have exposure to lots of bad loans, uninformed depositors may play it safe, running on their bank regardless of its individual exposure. This pushes the entire banking system into insolvency, causing a complete breakdown of financial intermediation in the economy, severely undermining economic growth.
Most economists, therefore, believe it is part of the role of government to stem banking panics, but not to make every failing financial institution whole. It is also important to regulate banking, because if banks can count on the government to bail them out in a panic, that limits their downside, encouraging them to take excessive risks with their depositors' funds. The best way to do these things, however, is a matter of considerable debate. With the introduction of deposit insurance, depositors no longer monitor commercial bank's investments, which is why the government tightly regulates them (for better or for worse). In the recent financial crisis, there were runs on so-called 'shadow banks', which work similarly to commercial banks, but operate outside of ordinary bank regulations.
The most important lessons, going forward: (1) preserve the banking system, not individual banks; (2) preserve institutions--preserve neither the management, nor the shareholders; (3) the purpose of regulation is to force bankers to put their own money on the line, not just the taxpayer's--otherwise, keep it simple. The US definitely erred too much on the side of caution in '08-'09, for which it may be rightly criticized, but it is safe to say swinging too far in the other direction may have done even more damage to the economy. Pick your poison.
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Thursday, February 23, 2012
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Fixing the corporate income tax
First, businesses only ought to report their revenue from sales. Second, they should deduct purchases from other businesses. Third, they must also deduct labor expenses (wages & benefits). On the difference, they ought to be taxed at a flat rate. No further deductions, credits, etc. Simple.
'Closing loopholes' sounds good, but the devil is in the details. If it is code for taxing purchases from other businesses, for example, then these may not be loopholes worth closing. Also remember that means-testing raises marginal tax rates. If you want to close loopholes, close them for everyone, not just big businesses.
Finally, note that corporate income tax reform has little or nothing to do with stimulating the economy in the short run. By contrast, it has everything to do with long-run economic growth, the state of the government's finances, and the distribution of wealth in society. So judge proposals on those terms.
'Closing loopholes' sounds good, but the devil is in the details. If it is code for taxing purchases from other businesses, for example, then these may not be loopholes worth closing. Also remember that means-testing raises marginal tax rates. If you want to close loopholes, close them for everyone, not just big businesses.
Finally, note that corporate income tax reform has little or nothing to do with stimulating the economy in the short run. By contrast, it has everything to do with long-run economic growth, the state of the government's finances, and the distribution of wealth in society. So judge proposals on those terms.
Supply-side economics, for babies
Suppose you're deciding how much gas to purchase. The gas station charges $x per gallon, but you also have to pay a gas tax of $y per gallon. The effective price of gas for you, then, is $(x+y) per gallon.
Suppose first that y = 0.25. In that case, let's say you want to buy 10 gallons. Now suppose that y = 0.75. Do you still want to buy 10 gallons? Those same 10 gallons would cost you $5 extra. Even if that isn't enough to make you want to buy a little less gas, it's plausible that someone out there is going to buy fewer gallons than they otherwise would, right?
How will the change in y impact the government's income? On the one hand, y goes up, which means every gallon purchased adds $0.50 more to the government's income. On the other hand, the gallons of gas purchased probably go down, which means every gallon not purchased deducts $0.25 from the government's income. If the former effect dominates, then the government's income rises with the tax hike. If the latter effect dominates, then the government's income falls with the tax hike.
Suppose you're deciding how many hours to work. Your employer pays you $x per hour, but you also have to pay a tax of y% on your wages. Your effective wage, therefore, is $x(1 - y/100) per hour.
Suppose first that y = 0.25. In that case, let's say you want to work 40 hours. Now suppose that y = 0.75. Do you still want to work 40 hours? Those same 40 hours would earn you only half as much. Even if that isn't enough to make you work less, it's plausible that someone out there is going to work fewer hours than they otherwise would, right?
How will the change in y impact the government's income? On the one hand, y goes up, which means every hour worked secures the government more income. On the other hand, hours worked probably go down, which means every hour not worked loses the government more income. If the former effect dominates, then the government's income rises with the tax hike. If the latter effect dominates, then the government's income falls with the tax hike.
What's the difference? Well, if the price of gas goes up, you become poorer, which makes you buy fewer things in general (and gas in particular). If the price of work goes up, you still become poorer, but that makes you work more hours to make up the difference. Thus, there is a third effect, which reinforces the revenue-reducing aspect of the gas tax, but reinforces the revenue-raising aspect of the wage tax. Common sense suggests, therefore, wage tax hikes are likely to be more successful in raising revenues than gas tax hikes.
What do the data tell us? Higher income taxes unambiguously raise more revenue, but some expected revenue is lost because some people do not generate (or report) as much income. In other words, the supply-siders had a point, but one that was way overblown. So when peeps tell you cutting taxes raises revenue, understand that there are multiple things going on, and that we have pretty solid evidence that other, more intuitive effects, tend to dominate in the end. Doesn't mean higher tax rates are desirable, but they would raise more revenue--possibly a lot more.
Suppose first that y = 0.25. In that case, let's say you want to buy 10 gallons. Now suppose that y = 0.75. Do you still want to buy 10 gallons? Those same 10 gallons would cost you $5 extra. Even if that isn't enough to make you want to buy a little less gas, it's plausible that someone out there is going to buy fewer gallons than they otherwise would, right?
How will the change in y impact the government's income? On the one hand, y goes up, which means every gallon purchased adds $0.50 more to the government's income. On the other hand, the gallons of gas purchased probably go down, which means every gallon not purchased deducts $0.25 from the government's income. If the former effect dominates, then the government's income rises with the tax hike. If the latter effect dominates, then the government's income falls with the tax hike.
Suppose you're deciding how many hours to work. Your employer pays you $x per hour, but you also have to pay a tax of y% on your wages. Your effective wage, therefore, is $x(1 - y/100) per hour.
Suppose first that y = 0.25. In that case, let's say you want to work 40 hours. Now suppose that y = 0.75. Do you still want to work 40 hours? Those same 40 hours would earn you only half as much. Even if that isn't enough to make you work less, it's plausible that someone out there is going to work fewer hours than they otherwise would, right?
How will the change in y impact the government's income? On the one hand, y goes up, which means every hour worked secures the government more income. On the other hand, hours worked probably go down, which means every hour not worked loses the government more income. If the former effect dominates, then the government's income rises with the tax hike. If the latter effect dominates, then the government's income falls with the tax hike.
What's the difference? Well, if the price of gas goes up, you become poorer, which makes you buy fewer things in general (and gas in particular). If the price of work goes up, you still become poorer, but that makes you work more hours to make up the difference. Thus, there is a third effect, which reinforces the revenue-reducing aspect of the gas tax, but reinforces the revenue-raising aspect of the wage tax. Common sense suggests, therefore, wage tax hikes are likely to be more successful in raising revenues than gas tax hikes.
What do the data tell us? Higher income taxes unambiguously raise more revenue, but some expected revenue is lost because some people do not generate (or report) as much income. In other words, the supply-siders had a point, but one that was way overblown. So when peeps tell you cutting taxes raises revenue, understand that there are multiple things going on, and that we have pretty solid evidence that other, more intuitive effects, tend to dominate in the end. Doesn't mean higher tax rates are desirable, but they would raise more revenue--possibly a lot more.
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
NGDP targeting, for beginners
What is nominal gross domestic product (NGDP)? It is, in principle, the level of money expenditures on the economy's output. If you buy a good produced by the economy for the price of $x, then you raise NGDP by exactly $x. Of course, the government does not track every money expenditure, but it estimates NGDP based upon various inputs.
What determines NGDP? In a word (really three words): the central bank. Why? The central bank is the monopoly producer of money (defined here to be paper notes and coins). It is legally permitted to produce however much money it sees fit to produce. Moreover, money's cost of production is nearly zero. Consequently, the central bank is in complete control of the money supply.
At any point in time, the public only wants to hold onto so much money (its money demand). The rest it wants to spend or invest (free up for others to spend). If the central bank provides more money than the public wants to hold onto, putting it in the public's hands by purchasing assets from them, then the public will spend the excess money, raising NGDP. If the central bank provides less money than the public wants to hold onto, removing it from the public's hands by selling assets back to them, then the public will cut back spending, lowering NGDP. Because the central bank determines the money supply, it by extension determines the level of money expenditures, or NGDP.
There is one exception to this relationship. Consider a case in which the quantity of money the public wants to hold onto becomes entangled with the quantity of money the central bank provides. To be more specific, suppose that every time the central bank expands the money supply by $x, the public's demand for money expands by $x, too. This situation is called a 'liquidity trap'. If the central bank tries to raise NGDP by expanding the money supply, it will fail to do so no matter how much money it creates.
The only way to raise NGDP in a liquidity trap is to contract the public's demand for money. The way to do this is to make holding onto money less appealing. How is the central bank supposed to do that? Liquidity traps do not last forever. Once the economy exits a liquidity trap, money demand becomes disentangled from the money supply. At that point, if the central bank expands the money supply, then the value of money will fall (the value of money equilibrates money demand with money supply). If the central bank credibly promises to do just that when the time comes, the public will expect the money they hold onto to decline in value. This makes holding onto money less appealing. The less money the public holds onto, the more it spends, raising NGDP.
Thus, by managing not only the contemporary money supply, but also expectations concerning the future money supply, the central bank is always the determinant of NGDP. Why, though, does NGDP matter?
Everyone's expenditure is someone else's sale. NGDP, therefore, also measures the economy's money-denominated output. Let P be the price level, the price of a typical good or service. Let Y be real output, the quantity of typical goods and services the economy produces. It follows from the preceding observations that NGDP = P*Y. Many economists posit sticky prices--that is, they believe that many prices adjust only sluggishly to various kinds of shocks. Price stickiness implies that P moves slowly in response to NGDP shocks. As a consequence, shocks to NGDP induce shocks to Y, or real gross domestic product (RGDP):

Monetary (NGDP) shocks have real (RGDP) effects. RGDP, or Y, is the economy's real output. Producing lower levels of real output does not require employing so many inputs--e.g., labor:

Monetary (NGDP) shocks drive the business cycle. Stable NGDP growth minimizes shocks to RGDP, smoothing the business cycle. In contrast, sudden, deep contractions in NGDP cause severe recessions:

At any point in time, there is only so much real output the economy can produce. Too fast NGDP growth maxes out Y, necessitating rapid growth in P--that is, inflation:

Stable, moderate NGDP growth maximizes employment while keeping prices stable, fulfilling the dual mandate of monetary policy. Targeting stable, moderate NGDP growth, therefore, is usually the best course for monetary policy. What, then, is the prescription for lowering the unemployment rate in the US, which has been experiencing slow NGDP growth? More money => more NGDP => more employment?

Looks like more money isn't doing the trick. Looks, therefore, like we're in a liquidity trap--the solution to which is the management of expectations concerning the future money supply. Suppose that, instead of targeting stable, moderate NGDP growth, the central bank targets a stable, moderately rising trajectory (or path) for NGDP. Under normal circumstances, the two policies work more or less similarly. The difference is that the former policy is forgiving of past failures, while the latter never forgets.
If, because of a liquidity trap, the central bank fails to keep NGDP growing at the usual rate, the former policy will continue to strive for NGDP growth at the usual rate once the liquidity trap is behind us. The latter policy, by contrast, will strive for faster than usual NGDP growth in order to catch up to the targeted path. Faster NGDP growth will require a bigger than expected money supply, post-liquidity trap. Thus, if the central bank targets a stable, moderately rising trajectory for NGDP, then encountering a liquidity trap automatically commits it to a bigger than expected future money supply (the longer the trap lasts, the bigger the commitment), which is precisely what our earlier discussion of liquidity traps called for.
Suppose that the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, promises to do everything in its power to restore NGDP to its pre-crisis trend line (see the third figure above). Since we're in a liquidity trap, this commits it to expanding the future money supply until NGDP makes a full, speedy recovery, but to do no more than that. Doing so would cause the public to expect the value of their money to decline over time, discouraging them from holding onto so much of it, thereby stimulating NGDP right now. And more NGDP, given sticky prices, would increase employment right now. The way to reduce the unemployment rate in the US, therefore, is for the Federal Reserve to target a stable, moderately rising trajectory for NGDP--in particular, to promise to continue NGDP's pre-crisis trajectory in a timely manner. Welcome, friends, to NGDP targeting.
What determines NGDP? In a word (really three words): the central bank. Why? The central bank is the monopoly producer of money (defined here to be paper notes and coins). It is legally permitted to produce however much money it sees fit to produce. Moreover, money's cost of production is nearly zero. Consequently, the central bank is in complete control of the money supply.
At any point in time, the public only wants to hold onto so much money (its money demand). The rest it wants to spend or invest (free up for others to spend). If the central bank provides more money than the public wants to hold onto, putting it in the public's hands by purchasing assets from them, then the public will spend the excess money, raising NGDP. If the central bank provides less money than the public wants to hold onto, removing it from the public's hands by selling assets back to them, then the public will cut back spending, lowering NGDP. Because the central bank determines the money supply, it by extension determines the level of money expenditures, or NGDP.
There is one exception to this relationship. Consider a case in which the quantity of money the public wants to hold onto becomes entangled with the quantity of money the central bank provides. To be more specific, suppose that every time the central bank expands the money supply by $x, the public's demand for money expands by $x, too. This situation is called a 'liquidity trap'. If the central bank tries to raise NGDP by expanding the money supply, it will fail to do so no matter how much money it creates.
The only way to raise NGDP in a liquidity trap is to contract the public's demand for money. The way to do this is to make holding onto money less appealing. How is the central bank supposed to do that? Liquidity traps do not last forever. Once the economy exits a liquidity trap, money demand becomes disentangled from the money supply. At that point, if the central bank expands the money supply, then the value of money will fall (the value of money equilibrates money demand with money supply). If the central bank credibly promises to do just that when the time comes, the public will expect the money they hold onto to decline in value. This makes holding onto money less appealing. The less money the public holds onto, the more it spends, raising NGDP.
Thus, by managing not only the contemporary money supply, but also expectations concerning the future money supply, the central bank is always the determinant of NGDP. Why, though, does NGDP matter?
Everyone's expenditure is someone else's sale. NGDP, therefore, also measures the economy's money-denominated output. Let P be the price level, the price of a typical good or service. Let Y be real output, the quantity of typical goods and services the economy produces. It follows from the preceding observations that NGDP = P*Y. Many economists posit sticky prices--that is, they believe that many prices adjust only sluggishly to various kinds of shocks. Price stickiness implies that P moves slowly in response to NGDP shocks. As a consequence, shocks to NGDP induce shocks to Y, or real gross domestic product (RGDP):
Monetary (NGDP) shocks have real (RGDP) effects. RGDP, or Y, is the economy's real output. Producing lower levels of real output does not require employing so many inputs--e.g., labor:
Monetary (NGDP) shocks drive the business cycle. Stable NGDP growth minimizes shocks to RGDP, smoothing the business cycle. In contrast, sudden, deep contractions in NGDP cause severe recessions:
At any point in time, there is only so much real output the economy can produce. Too fast NGDP growth maxes out Y, necessitating rapid growth in P--that is, inflation:
Stable, moderate NGDP growth maximizes employment while keeping prices stable, fulfilling the dual mandate of monetary policy. Targeting stable, moderate NGDP growth, therefore, is usually the best course for monetary policy. What, then, is the prescription for lowering the unemployment rate in the US, which has been experiencing slow NGDP growth? More money => more NGDP => more employment?
Looks like more money isn't doing the trick. Looks, therefore, like we're in a liquidity trap--the solution to which is the management of expectations concerning the future money supply. Suppose that, instead of targeting stable, moderate NGDP growth, the central bank targets a stable, moderately rising trajectory (or path) for NGDP. Under normal circumstances, the two policies work more or less similarly. The difference is that the former policy is forgiving of past failures, while the latter never forgets.
If, because of a liquidity trap, the central bank fails to keep NGDP growing at the usual rate, the former policy will continue to strive for NGDP growth at the usual rate once the liquidity trap is behind us. The latter policy, by contrast, will strive for faster than usual NGDP growth in order to catch up to the targeted path. Faster NGDP growth will require a bigger than expected money supply, post-liquidity trap. Thus, if the central bank targets a stable, moderately rising trajectory for NGDP, then encountering a liquidity trap automatically commits it to a bigger than expected future money supply (the longer the trap lasts, the bigger the commitment), which is precisely what our earlier discussion of liquidity traps called for.
Suppose that the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, promises to do everything in its power to restore NGDP to its pre-crisis trend line (see the third figure above). Since we're in a liquidity trap, this commits it to expanding the future money supply until NGDP makes a full, speedy recovery, but to do no more than that. Doing so would cause the public to expect the value of their money to decline over time, discouraging them from holding onto so much of it, thereby stimulating NGDP right now. And more NGDP, given sticky prices, would increase employment right now. The way to reduce the unemployment rate in the US, therefore, is for the Federal Reserve to target a stable, moderately rising trajectory for NGDP--in particular, to promise to continue NGDP's pre-crisis trajectory in a timely manner. Welcome, friends, to NGDP targeting.
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
What's up with bubbles?
Suppose you believe (unjustifiably) that real estate prices will keep rising for the foreseeable future. You thus believe you can buy real estate now, only to sell it later at a profit. You proceed, consequently, to buy lots of real estate.
Sold on the merits of your new investment strategy, you try to persuade your friends to do the same. On the one hand, if you're right, they too would profit. On the other hand, their added demand for real estate would boost prices further, increasing the value of your investments.
Your friends, understanding this plan to be a win-win, try to persuade their friends. And so on. Eventually, enough people with enough savings sign onto the plan that they seem to be having a measurable (positive) impact on real estate prices. Their impact, in turn, supports your belief that real estate prices will keep rising for the foreseeable future. Selling the masses on your plan becomes easier, as the theory underpinning it proves increasingly accurate. As more amateurs come on board, prices start rising even faster.
Sophisticated investors begin to take notice. They conduct extensive research into the causes of the run-up in real estate prices. To their surprise, the real estate boom seems to have nothing to do with people's desire to own real estate--instead, it seems to have everything to do with your success in promulgating your theory! They predict, therefore, that when your theory finally runs into a rough patch (real estate prices decline, for whatever reason), investors will sour on your plan, causing some to move their money elsewhere. This, in turn, will depress prices further, causing still more investors to call it quits. And so on. Anticipation of such a downward spiral will only serve to accelerate it, as investors compete to get out of the market while prices remain high. There will, in short, be a sudden collapse in real estate prices once reality sets in.
Initially, their inclination is to short real estate, which is sensible enough given their expectation of a bust. They then, however, recall the wise words of a famous speculator: "markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent." Once reality sets in, prices will surely come crashing down, but reality may take a very long time to rear its ugly head. In the meantime, playing the contrarian is a loser's game.
Despite the arbitrariness of your original forecast, then, you manage to bring the major players in the real estate market over to your side. With real estate prices skyrocketing, you become very wealthy indeed. But suddenly, to your dismay, the political discourse turns to the subject of illegal immigration. Some politicians want to make it easier for would-be immigrants to come to the United States, but many others demand that the problem of illegal immigration be forcefully dealt with first. With only the best of intentions, therefore, the government sharply escalates its efforts to identify and penalize the illegal immigrants in our midst.
The crackdown not only encourages many illegals to leave the US, but also discourages many would-be illegals from coming to the US in the first place. These incentives depress the demand for real estate, causing the price of real estate to stagnate, before gradually declining. Investors find themselves reading headlines like "Has the Real Estate Market Finally Peaked?", making them fear a rush for the exits. As the market begins its rapid descent, you wonder whether you're really the genius others believed you to be.

Cheer up, dude--it's not the end of the world. If I were you, though, I'd buy US bonds. My sources tell me Treasury prices will keep rising for the foreseeable future...
Sold on the merits of your new investment strategy, you try to persuade your friends to do the same. On the one hand, if you're right, they too would profit. On the other hand, their added demand for real estate would boost prices further, increasing the value of your investments.
Your friends, understanding this plan to be a win-win, try to persuade their friends. And so on. Eventually, enough people with enough savings sign onto the plan that they seem to be having a measurable (positive) impact on real estate prices. Their impact, in turn, supports your belief that real estate prices will keep rising for the foreseeable future. Selling the masses on your plan becomes easier, as the theory underpinning it proves increasingly accurate. As more amateurs come on board, prices start rising even faster.
Sophisticated investors begin to take notice. They conduct extensive research into the causes of the run-up in real estate prices. To their surprise, the real estate boom seems to have nothing to do with people's desire to own real estate--instead, it seems to have everything to do with your success in promulgating your theory! They predict, therefore, that when your theory finally runs into a rough patch (real estate prices decline, for whatever reason), investors will sour on your plan, causing some to move their money elsewhere. This, in turn, will depress prices further, causing still more investors to call it quits. And so on. Anticipation of such a downward spiral will only serve to accelerate it, as investors compete to get out of the market while prices remain high. There will, in short, be a sudden collapse in real estate prices once reality sets in.
Initially, their inclination is to short real estate, which is sensible enough given their expectation of a bust. They then, however, recall the wise words of a famous speculator: "markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent." Once reality sets in, prices will surely come crashing down, but reality may take a very long time to rear its ugly head. In the meantime, playing the contrarian is a loser's game.
Despite the arbitrariness of your original forecast, then, you manage to bring the major players in the real estate market over to your side. With real estate prices skyrocketing, you become very wealthy indeed. But suddenly, to your dismay, the political discourse turns to the subject of illegal immigration. Some politicians want to make it easier for would-be immigrants to come to the United States, but many others demand that the problem of illegal immigration be forcefully dealt with first. With only the best of intentions, therefore, the government sharply escalates its efforts to identify and penalize the illegal immigrants in our midst.
The crackdown not only encourages many illegals to leave the US, but also discourages many would-be illegals from coming to the US in the first place. These incentives depress the demand for real estate, causing the price of real estate to stagnate, before gradually declining. Investors find themselves reading headlines like "Has the Real Estate Market Finally Peaked?", making them fear a rush for the exits. As the market begins its rapid descent, you wonder whether you're really the genius others believed you to be.
Cheer up, dude--it's not the end of the world. If I were you, though, I'd buy US bonds. My sources tell me Treasury prices will keep rising for the foreseeable future...
Sunday, February 12, 2012
What is unemployment?
An individual is unemployed if she does not have a job, but she is actively searching for one. The unemployment rate is, therefore, the percentage of the labor force (those who either have a job, or are actively searching for one) who do not have a job; it is determined by means of a survey.
Why does unemployment matter? Consider the textbook model of the labor market. The labor demand schedule (D) relates the quantity of work would-be employers want to buy to the level of wages. The labor supply schedule (S) relates the quantity of work would-be employees want to sell to the level of wages. In equilibrium, the level of wages (P) is determined by the intersection of the labor demand and labor supply schedules. Because employers want to buy more work when the level of wages is lower, the labor demand schedule slopes down. Because employees want to sell more work when the level of wages is higher, the labor supply schedule slopes up:

Suppose that, for whatever reason, the level of wages is too high (in the diagram, higher than P). The quantity of work employees want to sell (the labor force) exceeds the quantity of work employers want to buy (employment). Unemployment, in this model, is the excess supply of labor due to wages being too high. Lower wages increase employer surplus more than they decrease employee surplus--that is, lower wages (provided compensating transfers) can make everyone in the labor market better off. Unemployment thus signals labor market inefficiency.
For the sake of efficiency, then, we want zero unemployment, right? Not quite. In order for dynamic economies to efficiently allocate labor, it is necessary for workers to change jobs from time to time. At every point in time, therefore, some "natural" fraction of the labor force is in between jobs, resulting in a non-zero unemployment rate. Moreover, because the unemployment rate is determined by survey, some individuals outside of the labor force may pretend to be actively searching for a job (for various reasons), further elevating the unemployment rate. The "natural rate of unemployment" is, consequently, thought to be significantly greater than zero.
What causes high unemployment? Demand-side stories cite contracting labor demand in the face of sticky wages. Supply-side stories cite contracting labor supply masquerading as contracting labor demand. Demand deficiencies cause unemployment rates in excess of the natural rate, while supply deficiencies cause the natural rate itself to rise. The mark of demand deficiency is slowing or static wage growth, while the mark of supply deficiency is rising wages.
It is important to correctly identify the cause. To see this, note that if the problem is demand deficiency, a fix for supply deficiency (encouraging workers to seek employment) raises, not lowers, the unemployment rate. If the problem is supply deficiency, a fix for demand deficiency (encouraging firms to hire more workers) does little or nothing to the unemployment rate, but creates other problems (e.g., excess inflation).
So, why is the unemployment rate in the US so high?

Looks to me like slowing or static wage growth since the onset of the recent crisis. Looks to me, therefore, like demand deficiency is the problem. The prescription for lower unemployment rates, then, is more work, not more workers. And the prescription for more work, recall, is greater aggregate demand for US economic output.
Why does unemployment matter? Consider the textbook model of the labor market. The labor demand schedule (D) relates the quantity of work would-be employers want to buy to the level of wages. The labor supply schedule (S) relates the quantity of work would-be employees want to sell to the level of wages. In equilibrium, the level of wages (P) is determined by the intersection of the labor demand and labor supply schedules. Because employers want to buy more work when the level of wages is lower, the labor demand schedule slopes down. Because employees want to sell more work when the level of wages is higher, the labor supply schedule slopes up:
Suppose that, for whatever reason, the level of wages is too high (in the diagram, higher than P). The quantity of work employees want to sell (the labor force) exceeds the quantity of work employers want to buy (employment). Unemployment, in this model, is the excess supply of labor due to wages being too high. Lower wages increase employer surplus more than they decrease employee surplus--that is, lower wages (provided compensating transfers) can make everyone in the labor market better off. Unemployment thus signals labor market inefficiency.
For the sake of efficiency, then, we want zero unemployment, right? Not quite. In order for dynamic economies to efficiently allocate labor, it is necessary for workers to change jobs from time to time. At every point in time, therefore, some "natural" fraction of the labor force is in between jobs, resulting in a non-zero unemployment rate. Moreover, because the unemployment rate is determined by survey, some individuals outside of the labor force may pretend to be actively searching for a job (for various reasons), further elevating the unemployment rate. The "natural rate of unemployment" is, consequently, thought to be significantly greater than zero.
What causes high unemployment? Demand-side stories cite contracting labor demand in the face of sticky wages. Supply-side stories cite contracting labor supply masquerading as contracting labor demand. Demand deficiencies cause unemployment rates in excess of the natural rate, while supply deficiencies cause the natural rate itself to rise. The mark of demand deficiency is slowing or static wage growth, while the mark of supply deficiency is rising wages.
It is important to correctly identify the cause. To see this, note that if the problem is demand deficiency, a fix for supply deficiency (encouraging workers to seek employment) raises, not lowers, the unemployment rate. If the problem is supply deficiency, a fix for demand deficiency (encouraging firms to hire more workers) does little or nothing to the unemployment rate, but creates other problems (e.g., excess inflation).
So, why is the unemployment rate in the US so high?
Looks to me like slowing or static wage growth since the onset of the recent crisis. Looks to me, therefore, like demand deficiency is the problem. The prescription for lower unemployment rates, then, is more work, not more workers. And the prescription for more work, recall, is greater aggregate demand for US economic output.
Saturday, February 11, 2012
What do central banks do?
The central bank (CB) is the monopoly producer of high-powered money (HPM), which makes up the monetary base. HPM comes in two flavors: (1) physical currency--paper notes, coins, etc.; (2) electronic bank reserves. In a typical developed economy, commercial banks must, by law, deposit some fraction of their customers' deposits into electronic vaults supervised by the CB. The funds put towards meeting this mandate constitute a bank's 'required reserves'. Any extra funds the bank deposits constitute its 'excess reserves'. The CB is the monopoly producer of HPM for two reasons: (1) it is the only entity legally permitted to create new physical currency; (2) it is the only entity legally permitted to electronically credit participating banks' reserves.
The CB is typically free to produce however much HPM it chooses, in either form. Additionally, HPM's cost of production is, approximately, zero. Consequently, the CB controls the supply of HPM in the relevant currency zone.
Why does HPM matter? The prices of goods and services are quoted in units of HPM--HPM is therefore the 'unit of account'. HPM is also what consumers use to buy goods and services--HPM is therefore the 'medium of exchange'. In equilibrium, the value of HPM is determined by the supply of, and demand for, HPM. Hence, in the long run the CB, through its management of the supply of HPM (its 'monetary policy'), determines the value of HPM, which is the flipside of the price level--the average price of goods and services. The higher the value of HPM, the fewer the units of HPM necessary to purchase a given bundle of goods and services. The lower the value of HPM, the greater the units of HPM necessary to purchase said bundle. As a result, monetary policy, executed by the CB, determines the price level, and therefore the rate of inflation (the rate of growth in the price level), in the long run.
If prices are perfectly flexible, then the economy equilibrates instantaneously, which means the CB determines the price level and the rate of inflation in the short run, too. Moreover, its policies are otherwise irrelevant to the evolution of the economy. Economists inclined towards a flexible-price view of the economy, therefore, believe that the sole objective of monetary policy ought to be 'price stability', usually defined to be a low and stable rate of inflation. If prices respond to shocks only sluggishly (that is, if prices are 'sticky'), however, then the economy takes time to equilibrate, which means that the CB plays a bigger role in the short-run evolution of the economy. Economists inclined towards a sticky-price view of the economy, therefore, believe that monetary policy ought to concern itself with more than mere price stability.
Suppose, for example, that the demand for HPM jumps (for whatever reason). This puts upward pressure on the value of HPM, meaning downward pressure on the price level. If prices are sticky, however, then many prices will remain too high in the face of this pressure. When the price of a good or service is too high, producers have the capacity to produce more than consumers want to consume. Producers react to this demand shortfall by contracting their output, rendering some of their inputs (e.g., labor) redundant. If wages are sticky, too, then redundant workers will continue to seek employment where there is none. As a consequence, output falls, while unemployment rises. If, in response, the CB expands the supply of HPM, this puts downward pressure on the value of money, meaning upward pressure on the price level. This offsets the downward pressure on prices, restoring the economy to equilibrium. As a consequence, output rises, while unemployment falls. Note that, in the process, the price level more or less stays put--monetary policy is impacting the economy without much impact upon price stability.
Considerations of such possibilities lead sticky-price economists to pin the blame for business cycles on the CB. When the CB does not provide the economy with enough HPM, it causes a recession. When it provides too much HPM, it causes high and/or unstable inflation. Monetary policy, therefore, has as its objective not only price stability in the long run, but also maximum output/employment in the short run.
What, then, do interest rates have to do with monetary policy? Interest is the price of a loan. A higher interest rate causes savers to save more, borrowers to borrow less. Savers make up the difference by building up their HPM reserves, expanding the demand for HPM, which (other things being equal) causes a recession. A lower interest rate causes savers to save less, borrowers to borrow more. Borrowers make up the difference by drawing down their HPM reserves, expanding the supply of HPM, which (other things being equal) stokes inflation. Thus, the stance of monetary policy may be equivalently characterized by either the supply of HPM, or a target for a benchmark interest rate. (The CB usually has no reason to interfere with the pricing of risk, so it typically manages a benchmark interest rate with reference to which financial markets fix other interest rates.) How, though, does the CB move the market rate of interest in line with its target?
An open market operation (OMO) is a transaction wherein the CB buys or sells assets in the marketplace, by drawing down or building up its HPM reserves. Since the CB can, in principle, expand the supply of HPM without limit, it can, in principle, buy or sell whatever quantity of assets is necessary to move the market rate of interest in line with its target. Because it can do this, however, it need not do this. If the CB declares a target for its policy rate (the benchmark interest rate it manages), market participants understand that there is no point doing battle with the CB. The CB always has more HPM than you, by design. Consequently, communication is usually enough to move interest rates towards the target, though the CB often engages in medium-scale OMOs to show its resolve.
The usual business of the CB, therefore, is to publicly set its target for the policy rate in a such a way as to maximize output/employment, while maintaining price stability over the long run. Sometimes, however, managing the policy rate isn't enough for the CB to fulfill its dual mandate. More on this issue to come...
The CB is typically free to produce however much HPM it chooses, in either form. Additionally, HPM's cost of production is, approximately, zero. Consequently, the CB controls the supply of HPM in the relevant currency zone.
Why does HPM matter? The prices of goods and services are quoted in units of HPM--HPM is therefore the 'unit of account'. HPM is also what consumers use to buy goods and services--HPM is therefore the 'medium of exchange'. In equilibrium, the value of HPM is determined by the supply of, and demand for, HPM. Hence, in the long run the CB, through its management of the supply of HPM (its 'monetary policy'), determines the value of HPM, which is the flipside of the price level--the average price of goods and services. The higher the value of HPM, the fewer the units of HPM necessary to purchase a given bundle of goods and services. The lower the value of HPM, the greater the units of HPM necessary to purchase said bundle. As a result, monetary policy, executed by the CB, determines the price level, and therefore the rate of inflation (the rate of growth in the price level), in the long run.
If prices are perfectly flexible, then the economy equilibrates instantaneously, which means the CB determines the price level and the rate of inflation in the short run, too. Moreover, its policies are otherwise irrelevant to the evolution of the economy. Economists inclined towards a flexible-price view of the economy, therefore, believe that the sole objective of monetary policy ought to be 'price stability', usually defined to be a low and stable rate of inflation. If prices respond to shocks only sluggishly (that is, if prices are 'sticky'), however, then the economy takes time to equilibrate, which means that the CB plays a bigger role in the short-run evolution of the economy. Economists inclined towards a sticky-price view of the economy, therefore, believe that monetary policy ought to concern itself with more than mere price stability.
Suppose, for example, that the demand for HPM jumps (for whatever reason). This puts upward pressure on the value of HPM, meaning downward pressure on the price level. If prices are sticky, however, then many prices will remain too high in the face of this pressure. When the price of a good or service is too high, producers have the capacity to produce more than consumers want to consume. Producers react to this demand shortfall by contracting their output, rendering some of their inputs (e.g., labor) redundant. If wages are sticky, too, then redundant workers will continue to seek employment where there is none. As a consequence, output falls, while unemployment rises. If, in response, the CB expands the supply of HPM, this puts downward pressure on the value of money, meaning upward pressure on the price level. This offsets the downward pressure on prices, restoring the economy to equilibrium. As a consequence, output rises, while unemployment falls. Note that, in the process, the price level more or less stays put--monetary policy is impacting the economy without much impact upon price stability.
Considerations of such possibilities lead sticky-price economists to pin the blame for business cycles on the CB. When the CB does not provide the economy with enough HPM, it causes a recession. When it provides too much HPM, it causes high and/or unstable inflation. Monetary policy, therefore, has as its objective not only price stability in the long run, but also maximum output/employment in the short run.
What, then, do interest rates have to do with monetary policy? Interest is the price of a loan. A higher interest rate causes savers to save more, borrowers to borrow less. Savers make up the difference by building up their HPM reserves, expanding the demand for HPM, which (other things being equal) causes a recession. A lower interest rate causes savers to save less, borrowers to borrow more. Borrowers make up the difference by drawing down their HPM reserves, expanding the supply of HPM, which (other things being equal) stokes inflation. Thus, the stance of monetary policy may be equivalently characterized by either the supply of HPM, or a target for a benchmark interest rate. (The CB usually has no reason to interfere with the pricing of risk, so it typically manages a benchmark interest rate with reference to which financial markets fix other interest rates.) How, though, does the CB move the market rate of interest in line with its target?
An open market operation (OMO) is a transaction wherein the CB buys or sells assets in the marketplace, by drawing down or building up its HPM reserves. Since the CB can, in principle, expand the supply of HPM without limit, it can, in principle, buy or sell whatever quantity of assets is necessary to move the market rate of interest in line with its target. Because it can do this, however, it need not do this. If the CB declares a target for its policy rate (the benchmark interest rate it manages), market participants understand that there is no point doing battle with the CB. The CB always has more HPM than you, by design. Consequently, communication is usually enough to move interest rates towards the target, though the CB often engages in medium-scale OMOs to show its resolve.
The usual business of the CB, therefore, is to publicly set its target for the policy rate in a such a way as to maximize output/employment, while maintaining price stability over the long run. Sometimes, however, managing the policy rate isn't enough for the CB to fulfill its dual mandate. More on this issue to come...
Friday, February 10, 2012
Must employer-provided health insurance plans cover birth control?
Some people believe they must. Other people disagree. Two questions occur to me in connection with this debate: First, what does birth control have to do with health insurance? Second, what do employers have to do with their employees' health insurance?
Insurance is supposed to prepare the insured for unpredictable, expensive scenarios. Needing to purchase birth control pills is a perfectly routine event. The pill isn't very pricey, either. Why, then, do people buy them with their health insurance instead of just reaching for their purse? It's not like car insurance plans cover fuel expenses.
What's more, your employer has no say over what your car insurance plan covers. Why, then, does it have a say over what your health insurance plan covers? What's so special about health insurance?
Believe it or not, many economists say that we have the tax code to thank for these curiosities of the US health care system. The story begins with World War II. One of the ways in which the US government financed the war effort was by printing a lot of US currency, causing excessive inflation. The government responded with wage controls, among other measures, legally preventing wages from giving way to inflationary pressures. Of course, the laws of supply and demand cannot be legislated away. Employers responded to the inflationary pressures by offering workers benefits besides wages, most commonly health insurance, simply because doing so was legal.
As wage controls were relaxed, however, congress began to recognize employer-provided health insurance as a form of income, thus subjecting it to taxation. By that point, though, labor unions had become staunch defenders of the tax-free status of employer-provided health insurance, discouraging congress from closing the loophole. Ever since, employer-provided health insurance has been tax deductible. Sound like intelligent design to you?
Why does the tax-free status of employer-provided health insurance matter? Suppose you wish to buy birth control pills. If you decide to buy them with your employer-provided health insurance, then you will pay for them with pre-tax dollars, effectively rendering them less expensive. If, on the other hand, you decide to pay for them out of pocket, then you will pay for them with post-tax dollars, effectively rendering them more expensive. Note that this does not work if you purchase your own health insurance plan. Health insurance is only tax deductible if it is provided by your employer. This explains not only why most people receive their health insurance from their employer, but also why cheap, routine medical expenses tend to be covered under health insurance plans.
For these reasons, a perfectly straightforward policy issue (whether every woman should have financial access to birth control) is, in the context of our distorted health care financing system, transformed into a mystifying debate about the complex relationship between your health insurance provider, your employer, your government, and you.
So, what's my proposal to resolve this controversy? Reform the tax code. Only then will we be able to meaningfully debate the proper role of government. Also, everyone needs to take a pill. A chill pill, that is...
Insurance is supposed to prepare the insured for unpredictable, expensive scenarios. Needing to purchase birth control pills is a perfectly routine event. The pill isn't very pricey, either. Why, then, do people buy them with their health insurance instead of just reaching for their purse? It's not like car insurance plans cover fuel expenses.
What's more, your employer has no say over what your car insurance plan covers. Why, then, does it have a say over what your health insurance plan covers? What's so special about health insurance?
Believe it or not, many economists say that we have the tax code to thank for these curiosities of the US health care system. The story begins with World War II. One of the ways in which the US government financed the war effort was by printing a lot of US currency, causing excessive inflation. The government responded with wage controls, among other measures, legally preventing wages from giving way to inflationary pressures. Of course, the laws of supply and demand cannot be legislated away. Employers responded to the inflationary pressures by offering workers benefits besides wages, most commonly health insurance, simply because doing so was legal.
As wage controls were relaxed, however, congress began to recognize employer-provided health insurance as a form of income, thus subjecting it to taxation. By that point, though, labor unions had become staunch defenders of the tax-free status of employer-provided health insurance, discouraging congress from closing the loophole. Ever since, employer-provided health insurance has been tax deductible. Sound like intelligent design to you?
Why does the tax-free status of employer-provided health insurance matter? Suppose you wish to buy birth control pills. If you decide to buy them with your employer-provided health insurance, then you will pay for them with pre-tax dollars, effectively rendering them less expensive. If, on the other hand, you decide to pay for them out of pocket, then you will pay for them with post-tax dollars, effectively rendering them more expensive. Note that this does not work if you purchase your own health insurance plan. Health insurance is only tax deductible if it is provided by your employer. This explains not only why most people receive their health insurance from their employer, but also why cheap, routine medical expenses tend to be covered under health insurance plans.
For these reasons, a perfectly straightforward policy issue (whether every woman should have financial access to birth control) is, in the context of our distorted health care financing system, transformed into a mystifying debate about the complex relationship between your health insurance provider, your employer, your government, and you.
So, what's my proposal to resolve this controversy? Reform the tax code. Only then will we be able to meaningfully debate the proper role of government. Also, everyone needs to take a pill. A chill pill, that is...
Tuesday, February 7, 2012
The interest rate is too damn high!
Suppose that, in period one, savers want to save just as much money as borrowers want to borrow. In period two, however, savers want to save more, while borrowers want to borrow less, than in period one. What happens?
In order for savers to save more, they must spend less. In order for borrowers to borrow less, they too must spend less. The money they're no longer spending is being saved by some, but borrowed by none. It isn't getting spent.
Less spending implies lower sales figures for businesses. Lower sales figures, in turn, make it unnecessary for businesses to employ as many workers as before. As laid off workers continue to actively seek employment, they raise the unemployment rate.
In period three, the central bank lowers the interest rate. Consequently, savers want to save less, while borrowers want to borrow more, compared with period two. What happens?
In order for savers to save less, they must spend more. In order for borrowers to borrow more, they too must spend more. The money they're now spending is being borrowed by some, but saved by none. It is getting spent.
More spending implies higher sales figures for businesses. Higher sales figures, in turn, make it necessary for businesses to employ more workers than before. As employment-seeking workers start to find work, they lower the unemployment rate.
Lesson: the interest rate is too damn high!
In order for savers to save more, they must spend less. In order for borrowers to borrow less, they too must spend less. The money they're no longer spending is being saved by some, but borrowed by none. It isn't getting spent.
Less spending implies lower sales figures for businesses. Lower sales figures, in turn, make it unnecessary for businesses to employ as many workers as before. As laid off workers continue to actively seek employment, they raise the unemployment rate.
In period three, the central bank lowers the interest rate. Consequently, savers want to save less, while borrowers want to borrow more, compared with period two. What happens?
In order for savers to save less, they must spend more. In order for borrowers to borrow more, they too must spend more. The money they're now spending is being borrowed by some, but saved by none. It is getting spent.
More spending implies higher sales figures for businesses. Higher sales figures, in turn, make it necessary for businesses to employ more workers than before. As employment-seeking workers start to find work, they lower the unemployment rate.
Lesson: the interest rate is too damn high!
Monday, February 6, 2012
The perils of preferential hiring
Suppose you're hiring. You're also a racist douche. In particular, you believe that (other things being equal) a white employee would be more productive on the job than a black employee. As a result, you're willing to pay more for white employees than for equally qualified black employees. Your preference for white employees not only expands the demand for white labor, but also contracts the demand for black labor. This raises the price of white labor, while lowering the price of black labor. Consequently, your non-racist competitors substitute towards black labor in order to reduce their labor costs. If your belief is wrong (which it is--you're a racist douche, remember), then your competitors can sell the very same stuff as you for lower prices, without sacrificing quantity or quality. Unless consumers boycott your competitors for employing black people, they will drive you out of business. Only if your belief is correct, or if the the market for your goods or services is non-competitive, will this fail to occur. Free, competitive markets, in due course, put arbitrarily prejudiced employers out of business.
Suppose instead that black people tend to be less productive than white people (other things not necessarily being equal). The result is that blacks are not proportionally represented in different walks of life (e.g., underrepresented among business executives, overrepresented among manual laborers). Would we really want them to be better represented at the expense of these jobs being performed less productively? Or would it be better to first let competitive markets sort workers on the basis of productivity, and then enable blacks to share in the wealth? In other words, which is better: a bigger slice of a smaller pie, or a bigger slice of a bigger pie? (Derp.)
Alternatively, consider the possibility that blacks are underrepresented in certain walks of life, and overrepresented in others, because they have different preferences from whites. What good does it do black people, or the broader society, to forcibly interfere with their choices?
If underrepresentation is due to arbitrary discrimination, then this probably has more to do with the unintended consequences of government policies (e.g., the drug war) than with competitive labor markets. If it is due to bona fide differences in productivity, the best course for everyone involved is to let the market rip, but provide means by which the resulting prosperity may be broadly shared. If it is due to differences in preferences, then the government can only make things worse. Frankly, I do not know what else could be the cause.
We find, in none of these cases, a compelling rationale for the government making distinctions between races. Even if blacks happen to be disproportionately poor, or low-skilled, or whatever, the case for helping them economically is just as strong as the case for helping similar non-blacks economically. Don't get me wrong: slavery is the single worst thing this country has ever done. Racial segregation is certainly up there, too. But if there exist alternatives to preferential hiring policies that make literally everyone better off, victims of these past injustices and their descendants included, why should we settle for preferential hiring? Why shouldn't we try to do better?
Suppose instead that black people tend to be less productive than white people (other things not necessarily being equal). The result is that blacks are not proportionally represented in different walks of life (e.g., underrepresented among business executives, overrepresented among manual laborers). Would we really want them to be better represented at the expense of these jobs being performed less productively? Or would it be better to first let competitive markets sort workers on the basis of productivity, and then enable blacks to share in the wealth? In other words, which is better: a bigger slice of a smaller pie, or a bigger slice of a bigger pie? (Derp.)
Alternatively, consider the possibility that blacks are underrepresented in certain walks of life, and overrepresented in others, because they have different preferences from whites. What good does it do black people, or the broader society, to forcibly interfere with their choices?
If underrepresentation is due to arbitrary discrimination, then this probably has more to do with the unintended consequences of government policies (e.g., the drug war) than with competitive labor markets. If it is due to bona fide differences in productivity, the best course for everyone involved is to let the market rip, but provide means by which the resulting prosperity may be broadly shared. If it is due to differences in preferences, then the government can only make things worse. Frankly, I do not know what else could be the cause.
We find, in none of these cases, a compelling rationale for the government making distinctions between races. Even if blacks happen to be disproportionately poor, or low-skilled, or whatever, the case for helping them economically is just as strong as the case for helping similar non-blacks economically. Don't get me wrong: slavery is the single worst thing this country has ever done. Racial segregation is certainly up there, too. But if there exist alternatives to preferential hiring policies that make literally everyone better off, victims of these past injustices and their descendants included, why should we settle for preferential hiring? Why shouldn't we try to do better?
How much credit does Obama deserve for the recovery? How much blame?
I don't know. Economic models do not, in my view, qualify as successful scientific theories. They do, however, shed a bit of light on matters of public policy from time to time (some more than others). The perspective I offer on this question is one that I find persuasive, supported by what I think to be the most compelling models, but I hardly consider it the final word on the subject. So, take from it what you will.
The standard framework, in contemporary business cycle theory, for thinking about recessions is provided by the New Keynesian DSGE family of models. These models pin the blame for recessions upon insufficient aggregate demand (AD) for goods and services produced by the economy. Sticky prices (prices that change too slowly), in the face of negative AD shocks, cause the economy to produce less than it is capable of, rendering some fraction of the economy's basic inputs (land, labor, capital, etc.) idle. Given price stickiness, the recipe for greater utilization of the economy's capacity, which would increase output and employment, is more AD.
Even if this is the best way to think about most recessions, one may always suppose that this time was different, that this was a fundamentally different kind of recession. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) measures the aggregate level of money expenditures. It is, therefore, the statistic that most closely tracks AD. During the postwar period, variation in NGDP growth explains about 2/3rds of the variation in output growth. Variation in output growth, in turn, explains about 3/4ths of the variation in unemployment. These figures increase, not decrease, when we restrict the data to the most recent recession (plus the subsequent recovery). In other words, this time looks to have been no different from a run-of-the-mill recession--just a very deep one, precipitated by a steep decline in NGDP. While the housing crisis, or the financial crisis, may have done something to NGDP, the economic plunge did not begin when the housing market started to collapse, nor when the shadow banking system suffered a run; it began when NGDP went south (before the demise of Lehman).
To me, therefore, it seems the focus of our inquiry should be on AD. Did Obama's policies (not only those he implemented, but also those he pursued aggressively) stimulate AD relative to what would have otherwise occurred? And to the extent that they did, were there other ways to stimulate AD that would have had fewer negative side effects? These are the questions we ought to be asking, in my view. There is much to economic policy besides AD, of course, but Obama's impact on the recovery from recession is almost entirely a story about AD. My next post will be about whether Obama could've done more to boost AD, and whether his efforts to date have been successful.
The standard framework, in contemporary business cycle theory, for thinking about recessions is provided by the New Keynesian DSGE family of models. These models pin the blame for recessions upon insufficient aggregate demand (AD) for goods and services produced by the economy. Sticky prices (prices that change too slowly), in the face of negative AD shocks, cause the economy to produce less than it is capable of, rendering some fraction of the economy's basic inputs (land, labor, capital, etc.) idle. Given price stickiness, the recipe for greater utilization of the economy's capacity, which would increase output and employment, is more AD.
Even if this is the best way to think about most recessions, one may always suppose that this time was different, that this was a fundamentally different kind of recession. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) measures the aggregate level of money expenditures. It is, therefore, the statistic that most closely tracks AD. During the postwar period, variation in NGDP growth explains about 2/3rds of the variation in output growth. Variation in output growth, in turn, explains about 3/4ths of the variation in unemployment. These figures increase, not decrease, when we restrict the data to the most recent recession (plus the subsequent recovery). In other words, this time looks to have been no different from a run-of-the-mill recession--just a very deep one, precipitated by a steep decline in NGDP. While the housing crisis, or the financial crisis, may have done something to NGDP, the economic plunge did not begin when the housing market started to collapse, nor when the shadow banking system suffered a run; it began when NGDP went south (before the demise of Lehman).
To me, therefore, it seems the focus of our inquiry should be on AD. Did Obama's policies (not only those he implemented, but also those he pursued aggressively) stimulate AD relative to what would have otherwise occurred? And to the extent that they did, were there other ways to stimulate AD that would have had fewer negative side effects? These are the questions we ought to be asking, in my view. There is much to economic policy besides AD, of course, but Obama's impact on the recovery from recession is almost entirely a story about AD. My next post will be about whether Obama could've done more to boost AD, and whether his efforts to date have been successful.
Sunday, February 5, 2012
Let's talk about the budget deficit, baby
What is the government's budget deficit? It is the difference between the government's expenditures and its income in a given year. The government's expenditures must be financed--if not by income, then by borrowing. Hence, the budget deficit is the contribution that a given year makes to the public debt.
What causes the budget deficit to grow? If the government's expenditures rise, other things being equal, or if the government's income falls, other things being equal, the budget deficit increases. That's it. It is always one, the other, or both that cause the deficit to swell. Consequently, any recipe for shrinking the budget deficit must involve less expenditures, more income, or some mix of the two.
Why does the budget deficit matter? The government's savings is, like for a household, the difference between its income and its expenditures in a given year. Thus, a bigger budget deficit implies less public savings. As long as decreases in public savings do not induce equal or offsetting increases in private savings, therefore, a bigger budget deficit makes for less national savings. Less national savings either contracts the supply of loanable funds, expands the demand for loanable funds, or both, raising the natural rate of interest. A higher natural rate of interest, other things being equal, stimulates the aggregate demand for goods and services (AD).
The central bank is usually tasked with managing AD by way of managing the market rate of interest. If AD was previously on target, by the central bank's lights, then the market rate of interest will be raised in order to offset the AD stimulus induced by the swelling of the budget deficit. Thus, under normal circumstances, a bigger budget deficit raises interest rates. At higher interest rates, private borrowers do not wish to borrow as much, which means that the government's additional borrowing is "crowding out" some private borrowing. In most cases, therefore, it only makes sense to increase the budget deficit if we have reason to believe that the government's borrowing will prove to be more productive than the private investment it is crowding out.
Additionally, the government's financing need not come solely from domestic lenders. Foreign lenders who wish to buy the government's debt will first have to exchange their own currency for the domestic currency. This expands the demand for the domestic currency, causing it to strengthen in foreign exchange markets. A stronger currency makes importing from the domestic country more expensive, causing the domestic country's exports to fall. Thus, a bigger budget deficit also produces a bigger trade deficit.
There is also a question of how the debt produced by bigger budget deficits is to be retired. One option is to roll over the debt, which is to say, borrow some more to make principal and interest payments on the debt in a timely manner. This is feasible so long as interest rates on government debt remain low. Another option is to increase the government's savings, by increasing its income (collecting more tax revenues), decreasing its expenditures, or a bit of both, in order to pay down the debt. A final option is to default on the debt.
The first option is the most painless. A government's ability to service its debt depends upon its power to tax its citizens, for this is its only (significant) source of income. As a result, the higher a country's GDP, the more able it is to service its debt, for this makes possible the raising of greater tax revenues. A government's ability to service its debt, therefore, is best revealed by its debt-to-GDP ratio, rather than its debt in absolute terms. So long as the country's economy is growing as fast, or faster, than the government's debt, investors do not have cause for concern. In such cases, the government typically enjoys low interest rates, making rolling over its debt feasible (forever, potentially).
The second option is more or less painful depending on the circumstances. Economic growth raises the government's income--often reducing its expenditures on safety net programs, too--thereby increasing its savings without anyone making sacrifices. In countries with serious growth problems, or serious debt problems, though, this may not be enough. In such cases, sacrifices must be made. Either tax rates go way up, expenditures go way down, or both. The more growth-friendly the reforms, and the more slowly they're phased in, the less painful the transition. The longer a country waits to make these sacrifices, the more hurried and more extreme they have to be.
If a country's debt problems get out of hand, the result is a 'hard landing'. Investors lose confidence in the government's ability or willingness to service its debts, so they charge higher interest rates for the greater risk they're bearing. Higher interest rates, in turn, worsen the government's finances, causing investors to charge even higher interest rates, worsening the problem further, etc. Eventually, it becomes impossible for the government to service its debts through either economic growth or budget reforms (see, e.g., Greece). At that point, the choice is between explicit default, or implicit default through debt monetization. Only countries with their own currencies have the latter option, and this option usually serves to slow the aforementioned interest rate death spiral. Both courses subject economies to severe financial/macroeconomic dislocation in the short run (due to either banking panics or currency crises), and much higher borrowing costs in the long run.
There's more to say on the subject, but the short story is: maintain budget deficits when crowding out is not much of a problem (i.e., when financing productive public investments, in the midst of a recession, etc.), but maintain budget surpluses the rest of the time, so that investors chillax and the government doesn't risk a hard landing. Don't wait to fix long-term deficit problems--the more thoughtfully they're approached, and the more slowly they're implemented, the happier the outcome. And don't worry so much about future generations. Debt is indeed a burden upon them, but they'll be richer than us, so, whatever.
ADDENDUM: In the United States, bigger budget deficits have not, of late, raised interest rates. The reason is that the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, would like to see lower interest rates, but its policy rate is near zero (its lower bound). As a result, the Fed has not raised interest rates in order to offset bigger budget deficits--in effect, it is having fiscal policy to do some of the work (of stimulating AD) that would normally be performed entirely by monetary policy. Nor have investors lost confidence in the US government (yet!), because they expect currently bloated budget deficits to shrink substantially as the US economy returns to full employment. The real deficit problem in the US stems from the implicit liabilities of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, etc. Without reform, these programs imply (under plausible assumptions) unsustainably large budget deficits that would, almost surely, shake investor confidence. Investors have been giving us quite a bit of breathing room to reform these programs, but the longer we take to do so, the more likely it is that we (or the next generation) will suffer a hard landing.
What causes the budget deficit to grow? If the government's expenditures rise, other things being equal, or if the government's income falls, other things being equal, the budget deficit increases. That's it. It is always one, the other, or both that cause the deficit to swell. Consequently, any recipe for shrinking the budget deficit must involve less expenditures, more income, or some mix of the two.
Why does the budget deficit matter? The government's savings is, like for a household, the difference between its income and its expenditures in a given year. Thus, a bigger budget deficit implies less public savings. As long as decreases in public savings do not induce equal or offsetting increases in private savings, therefore, a bigger budget deficit makes for less national savings. Less national savings either contracts the supply of loanable funds, expands the demand for loanable funds, or both, raising the natural rate of interest. A higher natural rate of interest, other things being equal, stimulates the aggregate demand for goods and services (AD).
The central bank is usually tasked with managing AD by way of managing the market rate of interest. If AD was previously on target, by the central bank's lights, then the market rate of interest will be raised in order to offset the AD stimulus induced by the swelling of the budget deficit. Thus, under normal circumstances, a bigger budget deficit raises interest rates. At higher interest rates, private borrowers do not wish to borrow as much, which means that the government's additional borrowing is "crowding out" some private borrowing. In most cases, therefore, it only makes sense to increase the budget deficit if we have reason to believe that the government's borrowing will prove to be more productive than the private investment it is crowding out.
Additionally, the government's financing need not come solely from domestic lenders. Foreign lenders who wish to buy the government's debt will first have to exchange their own currency for the domestic currency. This expands the demand for the domestic currency, causing it to strengthen in foreign exchange markets. A stronger currency makes importing from the domestic country more expensive, causing the domestic country's exports to fall. Thus, a bigger budget deficit also produces a bigger trade deficit.
There is also a question of how the debt produced by bigger budget deficits is to be retired. One option is to roll over the debt, which is to say, borrow some more to make principal and interest payments on the debt in a timely manner. This is feasible so long as interest rates on government debt remain low. Another option is to increase the government's savings, by increasing its income (collecting more tax revenues), decreasing its expenditures, or a bit of both, in order to pay down the debt. A final option is to default on the debt.
The first option is the most painless. A government's ability to service its debt depends upon its power to tax its citizens, for this is its only (significant) source of income. As a result, the higher a country's GDP, the more able it is to service its debt, for this makes possible the raising of greater tax revenues. A government's ability to service its debt, therefore, is best revealed by its debt-to-GDP ratio, rather than its debt in absolute terms. So long as the country's economy is growing as fast, or faster, than the government's debt, investors do not have cause for concern. In such cases, the government typically enjoys low interest rates, making rolling over its debt feasible (forever, potentially).
The second option is more or less painful depending on the circumstances. Economic growth raises the government's income--often reducing its expenditures on safety net programs, too--thereby increasing its savings without anyone making sacrifices. In countries with serious growth problems, or serious debt problems, though, this may not be enough. In such cases, sacrifices must be made. Either tax rates go way up, expenditures go way down, or both. The more growth-friendly the reforms, and the more slowly they're phased in, the less painful the transition. The longer a country waits to make these sacrifices, the more hurried and more extreme they have to be.
If a country's debt problems get out of hand, the result is a 'hard landing'. Investors lose confidence in the government's ability or willingness to service its debts, so they charge higher interest rates for the greater risk they're bearing. Higher interest rates, in turn, worsen the government's finances, causing investors to charge even higher interest rates, worsening the problem further, etc. Eventually, it becomes impossible for the government to service its debts through either economic growth or budget reforms (see, e.g., Greece). At that point, the choice is between explicit default, or implicit default through debt monetization. Only countries with their own currencies have the latter option, and this option usually serves to slow the aforementioned interest rate death spiral. Both courses subject economies to severe financial/macroeconomic dislocation in the short run (due to either banking panics or currency crises), and much higher borrowing costs in the long run.
There's more to say on the subject, but the short story is: maintain budget deficits when crowding out is not much of a problem (i.e., when financing productive public investments, in the midst of a recession, etc.), but maintain budget surpluses the rest of the time, so that investors chillax and the government doesn't risk a hard landing. Don't wait to fix long-term deficit problems--the more thoughtfully they're approached, and the more slowly they're implemented, the happier the outcome. And don't worry so much about future generations. Debt is indeed a burden upon them, but they'll be richer than us, so, whatever.
ADDENDUM: In the United States, bigger budget deficits have not, of late, raised interest rates. The reason is that the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, would like to see lower interest rates, but its policy rate is near zero (its lower bound). As a result, the Fed has not raised interest rates in order to offset bigger budget deficits--in effect, it is having fiscal policy to do some of the work (of stimulating AD) that would normally be performed entirely by monetary policy. Nor have investors lost confidence in the US government (yet!), because they expect currently bloated budget deficits to shrink substantially as the US economy returns to full employment. The real deficit problem in the US stems from the implicit liabilities of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, etc. Without reform, these programs imply (under plausible assumptions) unsustainably large budget deficits that would, almost surely, shake investor confidence. Investors have been giving us quite a bit of breathing room to reform these programs, but the longer we take to do so, the more likely it is that we (or the next generation) will suffer a hard landing.
Saturday, February 4, 2012
Misconceptions concerning inflation, Pt. II
Misconception #4: Inflation is the very same thing as printing money. Define inflation however you like--be my guest. Just note that if inflation is defined to be the printing of money, then the dominant theory of inflation, the quantity theory of money (QTM), becomes a tautology. The QTM says that x% money growth, in the long run, causes x% inflation. If inflation is the very same thing as printing money, then the QTM says that inflation leads to inflation in the long run. No shit. Let's call rises in the price level 'schminflation', then, so we can carry on.
Misconception #5: Inflation causes bubbles, which cause busts. I should begin by observing that no one has a definition of "bubble" that satisfies anyone else. Note that just as the US housing bubble was supposedly developing, home prices were appreciating in many other countries, too. While US prices eventually came crashing down, prices in many other countries (e.g., Canada) have kept on rising. Have these countries figured out ways to keep their bubbles from bursting, or should we conclude that the diagnosis of bubbles ought to be left to Captain Hindsight? Prices go up, then they go down, then up, then down, ... What insight is gained when we conclude that some one upturn followed by a downturn was a bubble, when no one can systematically identify bubbles ex ante?
In any event, below is the inflation rate during the 2000s:

And here is the Case-Shiller home price index during that same period:

Which came first, the housing bubble or the uptick in inflation? And which was first to reverse course? As for bubbles causing busts, note that the housing market began to fall apart long before the broader economy followed suit. Indeed, the collapse in the housing market didn't even accelerate once the economy went into the tank. By contrast, inflation lingered at 2.0-2.5% per year before plunging in concert with the broader economy. A prescient paper by Ben Bernanke (with a coauthor) contends that the responsibility of monetary policy is not to identify bubbles in order to burst them, but rather to keep the broader economy stable as it absorbs the shock. The economy didn't tank because the housing bubble burst; it collapsed because the Fed failed to keep AD on target. Had the Fed been aggressive enough in its response, the housing bubble would've ended with a whimper, not a bang. And it wouldn't make a difference whether we thought the movement in home prices was a bubble or not. Inflation would seem, correctly, to have nothing to do with any of it.
Misconception #5: Inflation causes bubbles, which cause busts. I should begin by observing that no one has a definition of "bubble" that satisfies anyone else. Note that just as the US housing bubble was supposedly developing, home prices were appreciating in many other countries, too. While US prices eventually came crashing down, prices in many other countries (e.g., Canada) have kept on rising. Have these countries figured out ways to keep their bubbles from bursting, or should we conclude that the diagnosis of bubbles ought to be left to Captain Hindsight? Prices go up, then they go down, then up, then down, ... What insight is gained when we conclude that some one upturn followed by a downturn was a bubble, when no one can systematically identify bubbles ex ante?
In any event, below is the inflation rate during the 2000s:
And here is the Case-Shiller home price index during that same period:
Which came first, the housing bubble or the uptick in inflation? And which was first to reverse course? As for bubbles causing busts, note that the housing market began to fall apart long before the broader economy followed suit. Indeed, the collapse in the housing market didn't even accelerate once the economy went into the tank. By contrast, inflation lingered at 2.0-2.5% per year before plunging in concert with the broader economy. A prescient paper by Ben Bernanke (with a coauthor) contends that the responsibility of monetary policy is not to identify bubbles in order to burst them, but rather to keep the broader economy stable as it absorbs the shock. The economy didn't tank because the housing bubble burst; it collapsed because the Fed failed to keep AD on target. Had the Fed been aggressive enough in its response, the housing bubble would've ended with a whimper, not a bang. And it wouldn't make a difference whether we thought the movement in home prices was a bubble or not. Inflation would seem, correctly, to have nothing to do with any of it.
Misconceptions concerning inflation
We want a positive rate of inflation in order to keep the unemployment rate at tolerably low levels. We want a low rate of inflation in order to minimize relative price distortions due to price stickiness. Most importantly, we want a stable rate of inflation in order to facilitate intertemporal transactions (for example, almost every financial transaction). Occasionally, we may want a higher than normal inflation rate (now is one of those times) in order to lower real interest rates when nominal interest rates are stuck at zero. Normally, however, a low, positive, and stable rate of inflation is what we seek, and ever since Paul Volcker broke the back of unstable, double-digit inflation during the early '80s, the central bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve System, has more or less delivered on those inflation objectives. Why, then, do some people worry so much about inflation, and insist upon monetary regime change in order to contain an inflation problem that exists only in their own minds?
Misconception #1: Inflation hurts those who save. Recall the lending example in my previous post. If I naively lend you my savings, without taking inflation into account, then I will end up getting back less than I was expecting. If inflation is stable, however, I need only adjust the interest rate I charge you for the rate of inflation in order to get back exactly what I was expecting. In general, so long as inflation is stable, savers need not fear it, for they may simply demand higher interest rates to compensate them for it, which is what savers in fact do. (This is why high inflation is correlated with high interest rates, low inflation with low interest rates, etc.) The only savers that stable inflation hurts are those who save by hoarding cash (by stuffing it under their mattresses, for example). These people, however, have nobody to blame but themselves. Even in the context of perfect price stability (0% inflation), the rate of return on cash is inferior to equally safe alternatives (e.g., Treasury securities). And if you're really concerned about inflation, you can always buy TIPS (Treasury inflation-protected securities), which adjust Treasury yields for CPI inflation. The reality is even the most insecure people typically don't stuff a lot of cash under their mattresses; instead, they stick their cash in government-insured bank deposits. And banks, of course, adjust their interest rates for inflation. Savers have nothing to fear, therefore, besides unpredictable inflation, but everyone has a stake in keeping inflation predictable, not just the savers.
Misconception #2: Inflation raises people's cost of living. Inflation is any rise in the general level of prices. Hence, the more inflation we experience, the higher the price of gas, right? The higher the price of gas, the higher your cost of living, right? Not quite. Inflation does show up in higher gas prices, but it also shows up in higher wages. Much like savers adjust interest rates to compensate for inflation, workers adjust wages for the same reason. Even though gas prices are higher, so is your income, which means gas is just as affordable now as it was when gas prices were lower. The same reasoning applies to other commodities. Inflation raises the prices of the things you buy, but it also raises the amount of money you have with which to buy those things. It has nothing to do, therefore, with your cost of living. What does determine your cost of living? One word: scarcity. The less stuff there is, the more expensive it is to buy. If higher gas prices raise your cost of living, it is not because the Fed is printing too much money. Rather, it is because there's not enough gas out there to support the previously lower price of gas. Unfortunately, Dr. Bernanke is not known for his oil drilling skills, seeing as the only way he may lower gas prices without also lowering your wages is by drilling for more oil.
Misconception #3: The gold standard is the best recipe for keeping inflation in check. This is probably the nuttiest idea out there. The gold standard is a monetary regime in which the money supply is adjusted over time in order to keep the money-price of gold fixed. The idea is that gold's value is inherently stable, and thus the value of money would be thereby stabilized. Here's the problem: suppose miners in South Africa unexpectedly discover enormous reserves of gold. Such a discovery would sharply depress the goods-and-services-price of gold, but in order for the money-price of gold to remain fixed, the goods-and-services-price of money would have to fall sharply, too, generating a sudden burst of inflation. Sound stable to you? Or consider a historical example: just before the Great Depression, France began hoarding lots of gold, for reasons unknown to the rest of the world. This raised the goods-and-services price of gold dramatically, which under the gold standard meant that the good-and-services price of money had to rise dramatically, too. The result was that France imposed catastrophic deflation on every country on the gold standard, triggering the Great Depression. How do we know this? Countries like China and Spain, which were not on the gold standard, suffered only mild recessions, and essentially no deflation, because of the collapse of their trading partners. Every country on the gold standard plunged into depression, in the midst of historically rapid deflation. But here's the best part: the timing with which countries began to recover from the Great Depression is precisely the timing with which countries abandoned the gold standard. Here is US industrial production at the beginning of the Depression:

Guess what happened right at the trough in early 1933? FDR took the US off the international gold standard. For serious.
The last few decades show that determined central banks are perfectly capable of keeping inflation at low, positive, and stable rates, without surrendering monetary policy to the random forces at play in the gold market. Why, oh why, does anyone want to go back on the gold standard?
Misconception #1: Inflation hurts those who save. Recall the lending example in my previous post. If I naively lend you my savings, without taking inflation into account, then I will end up getting back less than I was expecting. If inflation is stable, however, I need only adjust the interest rate I charge you for the rate of inflation in order to get back exactly what I was expecting. In general, so long as inflation is stable, savers need not fear it, for they may simply demand higher interest rates to compensate them for it, which is what savers in fact do. (This is why high inflation is correlated with high interest rates, low inflation with low interest rates, etc.) The only savers that stable inflation hurts are those who save by hoarding cash (by stuffing it under their mattresses, for example). These people, however, have nobody to blame but themselves. Even in the context of perfect price stability (0% inflation), the rate of return on cash is inferior to equally safe alternatives (e.g., Treasury securities). And if you're really concerned about inflation, you can always buy TIPS (Treasury inflation-protected securities), which adjust Treasury yields for CPI inflation. The reality is even the most insecure people typically don't stuff a lot of cash under their mattresses; instead, they stick their cash in government-insured bank deposits. And banks, of course, adjust their interest rates for inflation. Savers have nothing to fear, therefore, besides unpredictable inflation, but everyone has a stake in keeping inflation predictable, not just the savers.
Misconception #2: Inflation raises people's cost of living. Inflation is any rise in the general level of prices. Hence, the more inflation we experience, the higher the price of gas, right? The higher the price of gas, the higher your cost of living, right? Not quite. Inflation does show up in higher gas prices, but it also shows up in higher wages. Much like savers adjust interest rates to compensate for inflation, workers adjust wages for the same reason. Even though gas prices are higher, so is your income, which means gas is just as affordable now as it was when gas prices were lower. The same reasoning applies to other commodities. Inflation raises the prices of the things you buy, but it also raises the amount of money you have with which to buy those things. It has nothing to do, therefore, with your cost of living. What does determine your cost of living? One word: scarcity. The less stuff there is, the more expensive it is to buy. If higher gas prices raise your cost of living, it is not because the Fed is printing too much money. Rather, it is because there's not enough gas out there to support the previously lower price of gas. Unfortunately, Dr. Bernanke is not known for his oil drilling skills, seeing as the only way he may lower gas prices without also lowering your wages is by drilling for more oil.
Misconception #3: The gold standard is the best recipe for keeping inflation in check. This is probably the nuttiest idea out there. The gold standard is a monetary regime in which the money supply is adjusted over time in order to keep the money-price of gold fixed. The idea is that gold's value is inherently stable, and thus the value of money would be thereby stabilized. Here's the problem: suppose miners in South Africa unexpectedly discover enormous reserves of gold. Such a discovery would sharply depress the goods-and-services-price of gold, but in order for the money-price of gold to remain fixed, the goods-and-services-price of money would have to fall sharply, too, generating a sudden burst of inflation. Sound stable to you? Or consider a historical example: just before the Great Depression, France began hoarding lots of gold, for reasons unknown to the rest of the world. This raised the goods-and-services price of gold dramatically, which under the gold standard meant that the good-and-services price of money had to rise dramatically, too. The result was that France imposed catastrophic deflation on every country on the gold standard, triggering the Great Depression. How do we know this? Countries like China and Spain, which were not on the gold standard, suffered only mild recessions, and essentially no deflation, because of the collapse of their trading partners. Every country on the gold standard plunged into depression, in the midst of historically rapid deflation. But here's the best part: the timing with which countries began to recover from the Great Depression is precisely the timing with which countries abandoned the gold standard. Here is US industrial production at the beginning of the Depression:
Guess what happened right at the trough in early 1933? FDR took the US off the international gold standard. For serious.
The last few decades show that determined central banks are perfectly capable of keeping inflation at low, positive, and stable rates, without surrendering monetary policy to the random forces at play in the gold market. Why, oh why, does anyone want to go back on the gold standard?
Friday, February 3, 2012
Let's talk about inflation, baby
Inflation is a concept that many people seem to struggle with. A brief overview may be helpful.
What is inflation? Inflation is any rise in the general level of prices. What, then, is the price level? It is the average price of goods and services produced by the economy. Suppose, for example, that the price of everything doubles over the course of a year. In that case, the average price of goods and services--that is, the price level--doubles, too. The rate of inflation, in turn, averages 100% per year.
What determines the rate of inflation? The price level is determined by the intersection of the aggregate demand (AD) schedule and the aggregate supply (AS) schedule. Thus, the rate of inflation is determined by the rates of change of AD and AS.
The value of money is determined by the intersection of the money demand schedule and the money supply schedule. The prices of goods and services are quoted in units of money. As a result, it makes sense to think of the price level as the money-price of goods and services, and the value of money as the goods-and-services-price of money. These variables are two sides of the same coin. A higher price level means that one needs more money to buy the same goods and services, implying a lesser value for money. A lower price level means that one needs less money to buy the same goods and services, implying a greater value for money. The price level is thus simultaneously determined by the intersection of the money demand schedule and money supply schedule. Consequently, the rate of inflation is simultaneously determined by the rates of change of money demand and money supply.
The economic function of inflation is to concurrently equilibrate the market for goods and services (AD and AS) and the market for money (money demand and money supply). Suppose, for illustration, that the government creates some extra money, with which it buys things. This expands the money supply, putting downward pressure on the value of money, which in turn puts upward pressure on the price level. The result, in equilibrium, is inflation. Another way of seeing this play out is as follows: when the government buys these things, it puts extra money in the hands of people who were previously satisfied with their money balances. Not needing to add to their money balances, they spend the money instead, expanding AD, putting upward pressure on the price level. Again, the equilibrium result is inflation. The reverse experiment, contracting the money supply, puts downward pressure on the price level, the equilibrium effect of which is deflation (the opposite of inflation).
Why does the rate of inflation matter? First, in the short run, prices are sticky. The higher the rate of inflation, the faster each price must adjust in order for relative prices to remain the same. Price stickiness means that some prices may not keep up with the rest, altering relative prices, causing resources to be misallocated.
Second, inflation instability undermines intertemporal transactions. Suppose I lend you $100, to be paid back in one year at a 10% per year interest rate. A year from now, you will pay me back $110. If, in the interim, the rate of inflation averages 20% per year, then $110 in next year's dollars is equivalent to $91.67 in this year's dollars. You'll pay me back less, in real terms, than I intended. If instead I charge you a 32% per year interest rate, then a year from now you'll pay me back $132, which is equivalent to $110 in this year's dollars. By modifying the interest rate that I charge, I may nullify the effects of inflation. I can only do this, however, if the rate of inflation is predictable. If it isn't, then I do not know how much I will be paid back, regardless of the interest rate I charge; hence, I will be discouraged from entering into this transaction in the first place.
Third, there is a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. More AD/money supply, in the face of sticky prices, boosts employment at the expense of higher inflation, while less AD/money supply contains inflation at the expense of lower employment.
Ergo, the dual mandate of macroeconomic policymaking: maximum employment (enough AD/money supply to fully employ the labor force) and stable prices (not so much AD/money supply as to produce high and/or unstable inflation). The question, then, is which regime is most conducive to fulfilling this dual mandate. I believe the answer is NGDP targeting, but either way the above is most everything you need to know about inflation. In my next post, I'll try to put to rest some misconceptions about inflation. (E.g., inflation is bad for savers, inflation raises people's cost of living, the gold standard is the best policy for managing inflation, etc.)
What is inflation? Inflation is any rise in the general level of prices. What, then, is the price level? It is the average price of goods and services produced by the economy. Suppose, for example, that the price of everything doubles over the course of a year. In that case, the average price of goods and services--that is, the price level--doubles, too. The rate of inflation, in turn, averages 100% per year.
What determines the rate of inflation? The price level is determined by the intersection of the aggregate demand (AD) schedule and the aggregate supply (AS) schedule. Thus, the rate of inflation is determined by the rates of change of AD and AS.
The value of money is determined by the intersection of the money demand schedule and the money supply schedule. The prices of goods and services are quoted in units of money. As a result, it makes sense to think of the price level as the money-price of goods and services, and the value of money as the goods-and-services-price of money. These variables are two sides of the same coin. A higher price level means that one needs more money to buy the same goods and services, implying a lesser value for money. A lower price level means that one needs less money to buy the same goods and services, implying a greater value for money. The price level is thus simultaneously determined by the intersection of the money demand schedule and money supply schedule. Consequently, the rate of inflation is simultaneously determined by the rates of change of money demand and money supply.
The economic function of inflation is to concurrently equilibrate the market for goods and services (AD and AS) and the market for money (money demand and money supply). Suppose, for illustration, that the government creates some extra money, with which it buys things. This expands the money supply, putting downward pressure on the value of money, which in turn puts upward pressure on the price level. The result, in equilibrium, is inflation. Another way of seeing this play out is as follows: when the government buys these things, it puts extra money in the hands of people who were previously satisfied with their money balances. Not needing to add to their money balances, they spend the money instead, expanding AD, putting upward pressure on the price level. Again, the equilibrium result is inflation. The reverse experiment, contracting the money supply, puts downward pressure on the price level, the equilibrium effect of which is deflation (the opposite of inflation).
Why does the rate of inflation matter? First, in the short run, prices are sticky. The higher the rate of inflation, the faster each price must adjust in order for relative prices to remain the same. Price stickiness means that some prices may not keep up with the rest, altering relative prices, causing resources to be misallocated.
Second, inflation instability undermines intertemporal transactions. Suppose I lend you $100, to be paid back in one year at a 10% per year interest rate. A year from now, you will pay me back $110. If, in the interim, the rate of inflation averages 20% per year, then $110 in next year's dollars is equivalent to $91.67 in this year's dollars. You'll pay me back less, in real terms, than I intended. If instead I charge you a 32% per year interest rate, then a year from now you'll pay me back $132, which is equivalent to $110 in this year's dollars. By modifying the interest rate that I charge, I may nullify the effects of inflation. I can only do this, however, if the rate of inflation is predictable. If it isn't, then I do not know how much I will be paid back, regardless of the interest rate I charge; hence, I will be discouraged from entering into this transaction in the first place.
Third, there is a short-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. More AD/money supply, in the face of sticky prices, boosts employment at the expense of higher inflation, while less AD/money supply contains inflation at the expense of lower employment.
Ergo, the dual mandate of macroeconomic policymaking: maximum employment (enough AD/money supply to fully employ the labor force) and stable prices (not so much AD/money supply as to produce high and/or unstable inflation). The question, then, is which regime is most conducive to fulfilling this dual mandate. I believe the answer is NGDP targeting, but either way the above is most everything you need to know about inflation. In my next post, I'll try to put to rest some misconceptions about inflation. (E.g., inflation is bad for savers, inflation raises people's cost of living, the gold standard is the best policy for managing inflation, etc.)
It's morning in America
US economy grows 243,000 jobs in the month of January. In other news, Obama is looking to be a safer bet for re-election everyday.
Addendum: I should explain what I think is happening. In part two of my series on the jobs crisis, I said that too-high (cyclical) unemployment is due to interest rates being too high. To be more precise, there is a so-called "natural" rate of interest, which is the interest rate that would equate planned savings and planned investment, keeping aggregate demand on target. Aggregate demand management involves moving the market rate of interest to keep up with movements in the natural rate of interest. The Fed has been keeping its policy rate near zero since late 2008, so why is the (cyclical) employment situation improving? My view is that the natural rate of interest is rising, which effectively makes the Fed's unchanged stance more expansionary than it was previously.
Why is the natural rate of interest rising? Well, folks haven't been spending a whole lot (hence weak aggregate demand). Consumer durables (e.g., cars) only work for so long. At some point, you cannot delay that new car purchase any longer, so, you have to borrow more (more planned investment) and consume more (less planned savings). Together, that makes for a higher natural rate of interest. In other words, when a recession hits, consumers delay a lot of discretionary purchases until they're more comfortable with their financial circumstances, but you can only delay such purchases for so long. This crisis has been going on so long, and Americans are sufficiently impatient, that they're starting to go ahead with those purchases anyway. And that means that the Fed is effectively stimulating aggregate demand more than it was before, even if its interest rate policy is effectively the same (though they have been dragging out the first projected rate hike for some time, so that probably helps, too). If enough people begin to replenish their consumer durables, a self-sustaining recovery may be underway, as long as the Fed doesn't prematurely strangle it. Hence, it's morning in America...I think. (Buy stocks, sell bonds).
P.S. Matt Yglesias agrees with me to an eery extent. In fairness I generally see things the same way he does...
Addendum: I should explain what I think is happening. In part two of my series on the jobs crisis, I said that too-high (cyclical) unemployment is due to interest rates being too high. To be more precise, there is a so-called "natural" rate of interest, which is the interest rate that would equate planned savings and planned investment, keeping aggregate demand on target. Aggregate demand management involves moving the market rate of interest to keep up with movements in the natural rate of interest. The Fed has been keeping its policy rate near zero since late 2008, so why is the (cyclical) employment situation improving? My view is that the natural rate of interest is rising, which effectively makes the Fed's unchanged stance more expansionary than it was previously.
Why is the natural rate of interest rising? Well, folks haven't been spending a whole lot (hence weak aggregate demand). Consumer durables (e.g., cars) only work for so long. At some point, you cannot delay that new car purchase any longer, so, you have to borrow more (more planned investment) and consume more (less planned savings). Together, that makes for a higher natural rate of interest. In other words, when a recession hits, consumers delay a lot of discretionary purchases until they're more comfortable with their financial circumstances, but you can only delay such purchases for so long. This crisis has been going on so long, and Americans are sufficiently impatient, that they're starting to go ahead with those purchases anyway. And that means that the Fed is effectively stimulating aggregate demand more than it was before, even if its interest rate policy is effectively the same (though they have been dragging out the first projected rate hike for some time, so that probably helps, too). If enough people begin to replenish their consumer durables, a self-sustaining recovery may be underway, as long as the Fed doesn't prematurely strangle it. Hence, it's morning in America...I think. (Buy stocks, sell bonds).
P.S. Matt Yglesias agrees with me to an eery extent. In fairness I generally see things the same way he does...
Thursday, February 2, 2012
Issue #1: Unemployment in America, Pt. III
The recipe for a lower unemployment rate, then, is lower interest rates. Why isn't the US government delivering? Well, the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, which is responsible for setting interest rate policy, lowered its policy rate to essentially zero in late 2008, in response to the bottom falling out of the US economy. But why didn't it lower it some more? Why didn't the Fed go negative?
Suppose you have cash on hand. Your decision is whether to lend it to others or not. The Fed has pushed interest rates below zero. What do you do? I dunno about you, but I'd hang onto my cash. Why? Simple--cash earns (nominal) interest at a rate of precisely 0% per year. Zero sounds pretty bad, but I'd prefer zero to, say, negative three. Thus, if the Fed tries to push its policy rate into negative territory, folks will just hoard their cash, which does nothing for the unemployed.
What, in that case, can the Fed do for the unemployed under these circumstances? The Fed may no longer be able to lower interest rates today, but don't forget about tomorrow. Interest rates won't remain at zero forever, so there is surely a time at which the Fed is expected to raise interest rates. What the Fed can do today is to convince the public that it will not raise interest rates until there is enough aggregate demand to fully employ America's labor force.
Here is a picture of aggregate demand, as measured by nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) over the last decade:

Notice that when NGDP plunged, so did employment. Notice also that even though it has stopped plunging, we never caught up with the pre-crisis trend. That's why unemployment has remained so stubbornly high.
What the Fed ought to do is to make a commitment to keep interest rates near 0% until NGDP recovers to its pre-crisis trend level. In short, the solution to high unemployment is NGDP targeting. Think I'm pulling this out of my ass? Here's Goldman motherfucking Sachs. (Note that I was totally on this first--Jan Hatzius, bow to your sensai.)
That, my fellow Americans, is what I would do to put you back to work. Just hang in there for 13 years.
Next up: fossil fuels, deforestation, global warming, etc...
[Earlier posts in this series:
Announcing my bid for the US presidency
Issue #1: Unemployment in America
Issue #1: Unemployment in America, Pt. II
]
Suppose you have cash on hand. Your decision is whether to lend it to others or not. The Fed has pushed interest rates below zero. What do you do? I dunno about you, but I'd hang onto my cash. Why? Simple--cash earns (nominal) interest at a rate of precisely 0% per year. Zero sounds pretty bad, but I'd prefer zero to, say, negative three. Thus, if the Fed tries to push its policy rate into negative territory, folks will just hoard their cash, which does nothing for the unemployed.
What, in that case, can the Fed do for the unemployed under these circumstances? The Fed may no longer be able to lower interest rates today, but don't forget about tomorrow. Interest rates won't remain at zero forever, so there is surely a time at which the Fed is expected to raise interest rates. What the Fed can do today is to convince the public that it will not raise interest rates until there is enough aggregate demand to fully employ America's labor force.
Here is a picture of aggregate demand, as measured by nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) over the last decade:
Notice that when NGDP plunged, so did employment. Notice also that even though it has stopped plunging, we never caught up with the pre-crisis trend. That's why unemployment has remained so stubbornly high.
What the Fed ought to do is to make a commitment to keep interest rates near 0% until NGDP recovers to its pre-crisis trend level. In short, the solution to high unemployment is NGDP targeting. Think I'm pulling this out of my ass? Here's Goldman motherfucking Sachs. (Note that I was totally on this first--Jan Hatzius, bow to your sensai.)
That, my fellow Americans, is what I would do to put you back to work. Just hang in there for 13 years.
Next up: fossil fuels, deforestation, global warming, etc...
[Earlier posts in this series:
Announcing my bid for the US presidency
Issue #1: Unemployment in America
Issue #1: Unemployment in America, Pt. II
]
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Food stamps, there's a problem
One brisk Saturday evening you find yourself at your local gas station/convenience store combo. Nothing seems out of place. Yup there are your teenagers working the register. The tweens scoping out the candy isle. The old woman stealing sugar packets from the coffee island. Everything checks out. You grab your warm coffee, after all you have a long night of partying ahead of you. Eventually you mosey on up to the checkout line, only to find everyone in the county came to the store at the same time. Great, just great. Looking for something to do, you start to snoop on that person ahead of you in line - well the 10 cans of Red Bull surely caught your eye, quickly interrupted by the small child screaming that the top of their lungs that they want candy and lots of it.
Yup, nothing out of the ordinary...well until that person in front of you plops the 10 cans of Red Bull and various candy bars on the table. But that's not what caught your eye. It's the swipe of an EBT (food stamps) card and the transaction reading APPROVED across the cheap LED screen. That can't be right, can it? Are you telling me that person just bought $30 worth of junk using food stamps? I know that about only 1 cent of that probably came from my contribution to society but the concept still boggles the mind.
You're still trying to wrap you head around this idea when you notice the newspaper headline "Food stamps to be accepted at McDonalds." You're freaking kidding me right? This has to be the twilight zone where a $7 Big Mac meal with their large soda is being financed by the greater public. You pass out from the frustration, hitting your head on the 'Slippery when wet sign' (well no shit Sherlock) only to awake in a hospital bed hours later. What do you mean you only take Medicaid? Concussion from the fall? Kick me out on the street because my company has a good insurance company? Maybe this is the twilight zone...oh right, this is America.
What's that you say? You just bought a 70'' HDTV? Jeez, you must make a lot of money - I can see the 20" rims on your ever-so-fuel-efficient SUV. Thank the government? What, why? Food stamps? What the hell. Oh right, your $500 a month in food stamps let's you spend the $500 you would have normally spent on food on sneakers instead - don't think the government thought of that one.
So much for only being used for necessities. Food stamps, the next American dream.
UPDATE
I'm gonna have to get on welfare so I can hit up the local strip club: http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/06/news/economy/strip_club_welfare/index.htm?hpt=hp_t3
Yup, nothing out of the ordinary...well until that person in front of you plops the 10 cans of Red Bull and various candy bars on the table. But that's not what caught your eye. It's the swipe of an EBT (food stamps) card and the transaction reading APPROVED across the cheap LED screen. That can't be right, can it? Are you telling me that person just bought $30 worth of junk using food stamps? I know that about only 1 cent of that probably came from my contribution to society but the concept still boggles the mind.
You're still trying to wrap you head around this idea when you notice the newspaper headline "Food stamps to be accepted at McDonalds." You're freaking kidding me right? This has to be the twilight zone where a $7 Big Mac meal with their large soda is being financed by the greater public. You pass out from the frustration, hitting your head on the 'Slippery when wet sign' (well no shit Sherlock) only to awake in a hospital bed hours later. What do you mean you only take Medicaid? Concussion from the fall? Kick me out on the street because my company has a good insurance company? Maybe this is the twilight zone...oh right, this is America.
What's that you say? You just bought a 70'' HDTV? Jeez, you must make a lot of money - I can see the 20" rims on your ever-so-fuel-efficient SUV. Thank the government? What, why? Food stamps? What the hell. Oh right, your $500 a month in food stamps let's you spend the $500 you would have normally spent on food on sneakers instead - don't think the government thought of that one.
So much for only being used for necessities. Food stamps, the next American dream.
UPDATE
I'm gonna have to get on welfare so I can hit up the local strip club: http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/06/news/economy/strip_club_welfare/index.htm?hpt=hp_t3
Monday, January 30, 2012
Issue #1: Unemployment in America, Pt. II
Suppose that you expect to have a certain amount of funds at your disposal (you're expecting your next paycheck, for example). What may you plan to do with those funds? One option is to spend them today, consuming goods and services produced by the economy. Another option is to save them today, so that you may consume goods and services down the line. If you decide upon the latter, you have two more options to choose from. The first is to free up your savings so that someone else may make use of them, in exchange for a promise of repayment (with interest) when you're ready to spend. The second is to keep your savings to yourself--that is, to hoard money--until you're ready to spend.
Whether you decide to consume (spend your funds yourself) or to invest (let someone else spend your funds), you're contributing to the aggregate demand for goods and services produced by the economy. It's only if you engage in hoarding that you deprive the economy of aggregate demand. The job of financial markets is to match savers with borrowers. If interest rates are just right, savers want to save as much as borrowers want to borrow. Consequently, there is little hoarding, and aggregate demand is plentiful. If interest rates are too high, savers want to save more than borrowers want to borrow, causing hoarding, thereby reducing aggregate demand.
In my previous post, I contended that greater aggregate demand would reduce the unemployment rate, putting willing workers back to work. If the preceding discussion is correct, then, the recipe for stimulating aggregate demand is lower interest rates. What, then, my fellow Americans, is my diagnosis of our jobs crisis? The interest rate is too damn high!
In my final post on this subject, I'll explain why lower interest rates may not be so easy for the government to engineer, under the unusual circumstances of the present.
[Earlier posts in this series:
Announcing my bid for the US presidency
Issue #1: Unemployment in America
]
Whether you decide to consume (spend your funds yourself) or to invest (let someone else spend your funds), you're contributing to the aggregate demand for goods and services produced by the economy. It's only if you engage in hoarding that you deprive the economy of aggregate demand. The job of financial markets is to match savers with borrowers. If interest rates are just right, savers want to save as much as borrowers want to borrow. Consequently, there is little hoarding, and aggregate demand is plentiful. If interest rates are too high, savers want to save more than borrowers want to borrow, causing hoarding, thereby reducing aggregate demand.
In my previous post, I contended that greater aggregate demand would reduce the unemployment rate, putting willing workers back to work. If the preceding discussion is correct, then, the recipe for stimulating aggregate demand is lower interest rates. What, then, my fellow Americans, is my diagnosis of our jobs crisis? The interest rate is too damn high!
In my final post on this subject, I'll explain why lower interest rates may not be so easy for the government to engineer, under the unusual circumstances of the present.
[Earlier posts in this series:
Announcing my bid for the US presidency
Issue #1: Unemployment in America
]
Issue #1: Unemployment in America
Suppose that you own and operate a single firm. For whatever reason, it seems that the demand for what your firm produces has declined. Recognizing this, what should you do? Well, if consumers do not want to buy as much of your output as they did before, you should not produce as much output as you did before. There's no profit to be made in producing stuff nobody wants to buy.
Now that you have decided to scale back your output, it occurs to you that you no longer require as many inputs as you once did. Among your many inputs is labor. If you do not require as much labor as you did before, some of your workers must be laid off.
Responding to a fall in demand, therefore, you have in a very small way raised the unemployment rate. Your ex-workers do not have jobs, but continue to actively seek employment. But why has the demand for your firm's output pulled back? Presumably, other firms in the economy have either begun producing the same goods and services more cheaply (due to technological progress, say), or begun producing different goods and services which consumers want more than the goods and services you produce (due to a shift in consumer preferences, say). Whichever is the case, just as the demand for what you produce is falling, the demand for what others produce is rising. Needing to produce more output to meet growing demand, these other firms must draw upon more inputs--in particular, more labor. This raises the demand for labor, offsetting the fall caused by your firm, thereby restoring full employment in relatively short order. The unemployment rate is elevated only slightly, and only briefly.
Suppose instead that the aggregate demand for goods and services produced by the US economy declines. Much like your firm, the economy "recognizes" that the demand for its output has fallen, causing it to scale back production. Just as your firm would do in the course of scaling back production, the economy disemploys many of its inputs--most visibly, labor. The unemployment rate rises as in the previous case.
In contrast to our earlier example, however, a fall in aggregate demand is not offset elsewhere in the economy. Remember that, in this instance, we're talking about the economy as a whole--there is no elsewhere. Does this mean that the unemployment rate will be permanently elevated?
Ideally, no. The reason is that, usually, prices adjust to clear markets. In our first example, the way that the economy signals to the newly unemployed workers to shift out of your declining firm into other expanding firms is by pushing down the wages you offer, while pushing up the wages they offer. Similarly, if the aggregate demand for goods and services produced by the economy declines, this ought to lower wages in general, encouraging firms to hire more workers. And if wages fall far enough, quickly enough, the number of people looking for work but unable to find it will be as low as always. That is, the unemployment rate will quickly return to normal levels.
In reality, however, this does not happen. The reason, in the view of many macroeconomists, is that wages are 'sticky', or 'rigid'. When there is a drop in aggregate demand, instead of wages falling instantaneously, many wages fall rather sluggishly, or in lots of cases not at all. No single theory as to why this is the case commands a consensus, but the evidence in favor of wage stickiness is quite solid. If wages do not fall immediately when aggregate demand falls, then laid off workers will continue to apply for increasingly scarce job opportunities, keeping the unemployment rate elevated in the short run. In the long run, wages will fall far enough to restore the economy to full employment, but as J. M. Keynes famously remarked, "in the long run, we are all dead." A lot of unnecessary suffering is evitable if policymakers properly deploy the instruments at their disposal to stimulate aggregate demand, encouraging the economy to scale up production, which in turn encourages the re-employment of unemployed workers. In my next post, I will explain how best to do just that.
[Earlier posts in this series:
Announcing my bid for the US presidency
]
Now that you have decided to scale back your output, it occurs to you that you no longer require as many inputs as you once did. Among your many inputs is labor. If you do not require as much labor as you did before, some of your workers must be laid off.
Responding to a fall in demand, therefore, you have in a very small way raised the unemployment rate. Your ex-workers do not have jobs, but continue to actively seek employment. But why has the demand for your firm's output pulled back? Presumably, other firms in the economy have either begun producing the same goods and services more cheaply (due to technological progress, say), or begun producing different goods and services which consumers want more than the goods and services you produce (due to a shift in consumer preferences, say). Whichever is the case, just as the demand for what you produce is falling, the demand for what others produce is rising. Needing to produce more output to meet growing demand, these other firms must draw upon more inputs--in particular, more labor. This raises the demand for labor, offsetting the fall caused by your firm, thereby restoring full employment in relatively short order. The unemployment rate is elevated only slightly, and only briefly.
Suppose instead that the aggregate demand for goods and services produced by the US economy declines. Much like your firm, the economy "recognizes" that the demand for its output has fallen, causing it to scale back production. Just as your firm would do in the course of scaling back production, the economy disemploys many of its inputs--most visibly, labor. The unemployment rate rises as in the previous case.
In contrast to our earlier example, however, a fall in aggregate demand is not offset elsewhere in the economy. Remember that, in this instance, we're talking about the economy as a whole--there is no elsewhere. Does this mean that the unemployment rate will be permanently elevated?
Ideally, no. The reason is that, usually, prices adjust to clear markets. In our first example, the way that the economy signals to the newly unemployed workers to shift out of your declining firm into other expanding firms is by pushing down the wages you offer, while pushing up the wages they offer. Similarly, if the aggregate demand for goods and services produced by the economy declines, this ought to lower wages in general, encouraging firms to hire more workers. And if wages fall far enough, quickly enough, the number of people looking for work but unable to find it will be as low as always. That is, the unemployment rate will quickly return to normal levels.
In reality, however, this does not happen. The reason, in the view of many macroeconomists, is that wages are 'sticky', or 'rigid'. When there is a drop in aggregate demand, instead of wages falling instantaneously, many wages fall rather sluggishly, or in lots of cases not at all. No single theory as to why this is the case commands a consensus, but the evidence in favor of wage stickiness is quite solid. If wages do not fall immediately when aggregate demand falls, then laid off workers will continue to apply for increasingly scarce job opportunities, keeping the unemployment rate elevated in the short run. In the long run, wages will fall far enough to restore the economy to full employment, but as J. M. Keynes famously remarked, "in the long run, we are all dead." A lot of unnecessary suffering is evitable if policymakers properly deploy the instruments at their disposal to stimulate aggregate demand, encouraging the economy to scale up production, which in turn encourages the re-employment of unemployed workers. In my next post, I will explain how best to do just that.
[Earlier posts in this series:
Announcing my bid for the US presidency
]
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